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1. Introduction
A quick glance at most privacy legislation
indicates personal information provided for a
business or commercial purpose must be
provided to law enforcement authorities upon
request.  In the case of Australia, this infor-
mation must be provided to these authorities
for ‘the prevention, detection, investigation,
prosecution or punishment of criminal of-
fences or breaches of a law’ ([1], Schedule 1).
This broad and ill-defined exemption indi-
cates that the protection of personal informa-
tion is secondary to the demands of criminal
law enforcement, evidence gathering, the pre-
vention of crime and the goal of community
protection [2][3][4].
Privacy law potentially mediates the schism
between surveillance, reactive criminal detec-
tion and crime prevention. However, the ex-
ample of Australia indicates the reality of
privacy law as a substantive mediating force
against the growing tendency to use surveil-
lance technologies in contemporary criminal
justice is much less clear.
For two decades privacy scholars have out-
lined the social benefits of taking privacy more
seriously [5][6]. All Australian state and
federal jurisdictions have robust legal struc-
tures enabling Privacy Commissioners to work
with private industry and oversee the develop-
ment of codes of practice relating to the
collection, storage and accurate maintenance
of personal information for business pur-
poses. Human rights instruments also con-
tain specific references to privacy that are
enforceable against state Parliaments, courts,
tribunals and relevant statutory authorities.
For example, as long as there are no compet-
ing national laws that enable government
intrusions into the private domain, Victorian
law confers two main rights to privacy on all
individuals that are enforceable against public
authorities operating within that state:
a) [The right] not to have his or her privacy,
family, home or correspondence unlawfully
or arbitrarily interfered with; and
b) [The right] not to have his or her reputation
unlawfully attacked ([7], section 13).
These principles focus mainly on intrusions
into the private home, with the emphasis on
personal reputation being more akin to the
power of defamation law to prevent unneces-
sary snooping and gossip about personal
activity. However, any untoward intrusions
that occur beyond the private or personal
realm remain beyond these legal protections.
Nevertheless, the ability to access goods and
services, or the adoption of new technological
strategies in public and semi-public spaces
remains a growing facet of contemporary life
[8], with the nexus between safety, security
and information privacy extending well be-
yond those rights protected by most current
Australian laws.
Australian state and federal privacy legisla-
tion allows concerned citizens to question the
measures adopted by private businesses to
solicit or maintain personal information for
the provision of goods or services [1][9].
Regardless of how frequently these measures
are activated by concerned citizens, any per-
sonal legal rights to privacy or any codes of
practice developed between private industry
and designated Privacy Commissioners do
little to erode the function creep of new tech-
nologies in the delivery of commercial or
governmental services.
Growing demands for providing quicker and
more efficient ways of delivering services to
ordinary citizens [10][11] also extend to the
law enforcement field, where police agencies
increasingly rely on new technologies to en-
hance their investigative, crime prevention or
mass surveillance capacities. For example,
road traffic control is one area of law enforce-
ment that has become so dependent on new
surveillance technologies that the administra-
tion of fines and other punishments for prob-
lematic driving is almost fully automated.
This form of simulated justice [12] comes at
considerable cost, particularly when police
managers or operational personnel fail to
adapt conventional modes of enforcement to
ensure new technologies are deployed accord-
ing to accepted due process requirements
[13].
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technologies in contemporary law enforcement. In part, this is due to the construction of current
Australian privacy laws and oversight principles. We argue this in itself does not solely account for the
limitations of privacy regimes, as recent Canadian research demonstrates how privacy regulation generates
limited control over the expansion of new crime prevention technologies. However, a more telling problem
involves the enactment of new laws allowing police and venue operators to exclude the undesirable from
venues, streets and entertainment zones. These developments reflect the broader shift to governing
through sub-sovereign territorial controls that seek to leverage many current and emerging surveillance
technologies and their normalisation in preventing crime without being encumbered by the niceties of
privacy law.
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A recent Ombudsman’s report examining the
implementation of new data management
systems in several Victorian government de-
partments is particularly critical of the lack of
coordinated leadership behind the deployment
of many technological initiatives in contem-
porary public administration [14].
A crucial example involves the protracted
efforts to upgrade the Victoria Police crime
database. The report identified considerable
financial waste stemmed from the absence of
clear managerial oversight of the implemen-
tation of this important upgrade. More im-
portantly, this lack of a strategic long-term
vision meant that any new data management
and dissemination strategies were adopted
without adequate consideration of the future
objectives of the organisation. The report
concluded that the Victoria Police was clearly
unwilling to adapt its ‘business processes to
fit the new system’, because it was preoccu-
pied with making ‘the system fit Victoria
Police’s [existing] processes’ ([14], p. 66).
The end result was the ultimate abandonment
of the database upgrade after five years of
preliminary work and the expenditure of tens
of millions of dollars. The cause of this
wastage was simple: Victoria Police had not
‘defined and set a clear vision for modern
policing out to 2030’, established clear busi-
ness requirements, adequately planned for
organisational transformation from a paper-
based organisation to an electronic
organisation or established clear ownership
and accountability for organisational trans-
formation  ([14], p. 66).
The sense of mistrust associated with these
large-scale publicly funded databases filters
into the routine uses of new technologies to
supplement conventional operational polic-
ing activities. Here, extensive reforms to the
criminal law introduce lower legal thresholds
to combat minor forms of crime or antisocial
behaviour [15], which fuel more intrusive
forms of mass surveillance in both public and
semi-public spaces. These developments can
have several negative social impacts [16][17].
While much has been written about the con-
temporary ‘reflex application of the criminal
law … to deal with complex social problems’
([18], p. ix), the use of technology by police
or private agencies, such as open space CCTV
systems or mobile phone tracking devices in
large privately owned shopping malls, increases
the scale of dataveillance in contemporary
life. This in turn helps to normalise the use of
questionable information technology and data
mining practices for fairly routine low-level
law enforcement activities.
The power of existing privacy laws to contain
both the nature of such information gather-
ing and the desirable uses of personal data is
limited in two ways.
First, there is little scope for privacy law to
allow citizens to collectively challenge the
growing function creep of new surveillance
technologies employed by police, other gov-
ernment departments or private businesses.
As with many other areas of law, the right to
correct an actual or suspected privacy breach
can only be determined after an aggrieved
person has detected a suspected violation by
providing sufficient evidence of harm to con-
vince a court or other official body that legal
intervention is required. This ‘back-end’ pro-
cess is partially tempered by Australian Pri-
vacy and Information Commission struc-
tures, which enable the development and imple-
mentation of codes of practice to prevent
breaches of agreed standards by private busi-
nesses or local governments. These processes
are yet to be researched in depth in Australia.
However, emerging research into similar over-
sight methods in Canada indicates that ex-
tremely diverse standards of information
management are developed for the adminis-
tration of open space CCTV networks, which
undermines consistency in the application of
privacy law. Moreover, Commissioners rou-
tinely prioritise public safety over individual
or collective privacy interests when developing
methods of overseeing the operation of these
systems and related data access, storage and
maintenance protocols [19].
Second, these processes are fuelled by the
express exemption under Australian privacy
law regarding crime. This crucial term has yet
to be scrutinised in detail by Australian courts.
The complex relationship between crime pre-
vention [20], technology and privacy adds
weight to Hier and Walby’s [19] concerns
regarding the value of current privacy laws in
protecting the community from the expanded
uses of intrusive surveillance technologies or
the data they generate. As Solove [21] indi-
cates, the emotive nature of crime and security
debates establishes an uneven playing field
where the privacy interests of few are consid-
ered to unnecessarily compromise the safety
of the majority. Solove’s concern is that the
failure to equate privacy with greater security
means that in any debate between these two
important social concerns, security and com-
munity protection will always win. This means
privacy rights run the risk of dissolving as
more surveillance technologies permeate the
contemporary crime prevention landscape,
even if, as the Victorian example indicates,
both the high- and low-end uses of these
forms of dataveillance are not necessarily
matched by shifts in the prevailing enforce-
ment philosophies that inform their deploy-
ment.
One area where these debates are prominent
is within the management of the contempo-
rary night-time economy. In recent decades
law enforcement agencies, often working
alongside community groups and venue pro-
prietors, have faced growing pressure to stra-
tegically identify and prevent the risks of
collective violence, antisocial behaviour and
disorder in and around licensed venues [22].
This push has generated extensive reforms to
enable increased surveillance of those partici-
pating in the night-time economy, along with
a greater range of fines and other punish-
ments for more trivial forms of unruly
behaviour. The following discussion builds
on our extensive research into the use of
computerized ID scanning in the Australian
night-time economy by challenging the com-
mon assumption that new surveillance tech-
nologies automatically make the night-time
economy safer or easier to manage. More
importantly, information privacy law appears
largely incapable of preventing the normaliza-
tion of this form of surveillance. This trend is
especially problematic when viewed in con-
junction with the introduction of zonal ban-
ning laws aimed at removing disorderly people
from individual venues, nightclub precincts
or designated zones incorporating the central
business districts (CBDs) of Australia’s ur-
ban and regional cities.
2. ID Scanning, Function Creep
and Privacy in Australia
Mandatory patron ID scanning has become
an increasingly popular method of attempt-
ing to minimise the prospect that disorderly
or violent people will enter nightclubs or
entire entertainment precincts in many Aus-
tralian cities. This technology enables propri-
etors to take a digital image of a patron’s
identification document and a photograph or
biometric identifier, such as a fingerprint,
prior to allowing entry into a venue licensed
to sell alcohol. The person’s identity can then
be instantly matched with manual records
entered into the database that alert door staff
about patrons who have been banned from
The example of Australia indicates the reality of privacy law as a
substantive mediating force against the growing tendency to use surveillance
technologies in contemporary criminal justice is much less clear
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the venue. As a recent Victorian report on
Surveillance in Public Places indicates, one
major casino in Melbourne has deployed: "…
[i]dentification scanners [to] record the
image and written details on an individual’s
driving license or other identity card, includ-
ing their name and address. Facial recogni-
tion software scans patrons’ faces as they
enter the nightclub and matches those im-
ages against a database of photos. In this
way the software can be used to identify
patrons who have been previously banned
from a venue. The software can be shared
among venues" ([23], p. 40).
Unlike some United States jurisdictions [27]
where ID scanners have been specifically en-
dorsed in state liquor licensing laws, many
systems in Australia have been adopted at a
piecemeal level at the discretion of individual
venue operators. However, at least two re-
gions in Australia have seen a more formal
approach to the use of ID scanners alongside
several additional measures aimed at com-
bating alcohol-related harm.
In March 2010 the Queensland Parliament
Law, Justice and Safety Committee released
an extensive report outlining ‘best practice’ in
the management of alcohol supply within that
state. The report emerged from concerns that
Australia’s historical ‘knock ‘em down’ atti-
tude towards alcohol consumption and
mateship, had given way to: "… a growing
culture of [binge] drinking to harmful levels,
without any pride or self-respect. Vomiting,
falling over, and creating a nuisance in public
are not seen as shameful but to some are
badges of honour. A lack of self-respect and
respect for others seems entrenched" ([24b, p.
i).
A series of public hearings, venue site visits by
Committee members and written submis-
sions by various ‘stakeholders’, including li-
quor industry representatives, legal services,
youth advocacy groups and education pro-
viders, generated an extensive report examin-
ing the causes of alcohol-related violence and
offered several proposals to improve venue
amenity, transport, responsible service of al-
cohol guidelines and the use of surveillance
technologies to manage behaviour in the night-
time economy. A total of sixty-eight recom-
mendations were proposed, ranging from
formal amendments to criminal and sum-
mary offence laws, to the more stringent
implementation of national public health pro-
grams targeting young people in schools and
other community settings.
The final report recognised that ID scanning
had been adopted by a number of venues
throughout Queensland and in several cases
was successfully ‘used in conjunction with
CCTV images to identify offenders’ ([24b],
p. 24). In some ‘high risk areas’ where more
than one premises had deployed this technol-
ogy, system networking allowed a quick and
easy method of determining that a patron
banned from one premises should not be
allowed entry into another. Various
organisations, including the Queensland Po-
lice Union of Employees and the Liquor
Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union, sup-
ported this technology due to its potential to
deter troublemakers and enable police to ef-
ficiently identify those engaging in violent or
antisocial behavior.
The following submission from the Chief
Executive of the Queensland Hotels’ Asso-
ciation aptly captures the positive view of this
technology: "We have introduced ID scanning
where the appropriate form of ID is scanned
at the point of entry, and that acts as a clear
deterrent to patrons who might otherwise be
intending to get up to no good. People know
that, if their identity is held in a safe computer
and if they create harm or create violence or
break the law, those people who are authorised
to access the hard drive, being the Police
Service, will be able to track them down" [24b,
p. 25).
However, a lengthy submission from the
Queensland Information Commissioner
raised several concerns over the desirability of
extending the use of ID scanners pending the
development of agreed information manage-
ment standards, or more detailed discussion
of their legal implications under current
Queensland and national privacy legislation.
Two main concerns informed this submis-
sion. The first involved reservations about the
causal link between alcohol and violence in the
public imagination. This had the potential to
place undue reliance on ID scanning as a quick
and effective ‘technological fix’ [25] to the
problem of drinking culture, at the expense of
other less intrusive harm minimization strat-
egies. The second relates to the use of
dataveillance to achieve substantive improve-
ments in social order. Not only is the deterrent
effect of ID scanning difficult to establish, but
real concerns also surround the monitoring
of all venue patrons through such technology.
This means that ‘the collection of personal
information by licensed premises’ is more
likely to involve questionable forms of
dataveillance, with ID scanners becoming ‘the
all seeing eye for law enforcement by police’
([24b], p. 25).
While Queensland has not been plagued by the
same difficulties surrounding the adoption of
new law enforcement technologies that were
identified by the Victorian Ombudsman [14],
the relatively unquestioned acceptance of ID
scanning technologies, either with or without
an appropriate trial or adequate consider-
ation of their privacy implications, presents
numerous problems. Importantly, many other
situational and supply-based policy interven-
tions can have a meaningful impact in altering
negative drinking cultures. Nevertheless, de-
spite these concerns the final report recom-
mended licensees trading after midnight should
be encouraged to install ID scanning systems
with ‘due regard to privacy issues and matters
of natural justice’ ([24b], p. 27).
Neither the report nor the government’s for-
mal response clarifies the specific implica-
tions of the terms ‘due regard’ or ‘natural
justice’. It was suggested venues should re-
ceive discounted licensing fees for installing
ID scanners, but this proposal was ultimately
abandoned with the Queensland government
introducing a ‘new more secure, more durable
and more reliable driver license card’ in 2010
([26], p. 5). More problematically, this ex-
ample illustrates how Australian governments
appear willing to override key issues relating
to information privacy given the seemingly
more pressing demands of combating alco-
hol-related disorder through expanded and
untested surveillance measures. Interestingly,
the Committee’s interim report recognised
both ‘the safety of patrons and the protection
of their identity documents are paramount’
and strongly cautioned against the widespread
use of networked ID scanning until these
issues were adequately addressed ([24a], p.
8).
The mandatory adoption of ID scanning in
the ‘high risk’ venues trading after 1.00 am in
the Victorian city of Geelong followed a
slightly different trajectory. In response to
several widely publicised violent crimes in the
city’s nightclub precinct during late 2006,
police, venue proprietors, the local council
and concerned citizens used a voluntary Li-
quor Accord to reform the night-time economy
within the 2.5 square kilometre CBD. This
region contains up to ten licensed hotels that
are popular amongst the local population,
large numbers of university students and
holidaymakers venturing to Victoria’s coastal
resorts during the summer months [28]. Key
The person’s identity can then be instantly matched with
manual records entered into the database that alert door staff
about patrons who have been banned from the venue
“
”
 novática Special English Edition - 2012/2013 Annual Selection of Articles 29
Privacy and New Technologies monograph
m o n o g r a p h
stakeholders involved in the Geelong Liquor
Accord agreed to pilot ID scanners at ten
venues between May and November 2007.
However, neither the initial pilot, nor the
formalisation of this technology as a manda-
tory condition of entry into all high-risk ven-
ues under the revised Accord that was released
in November 2007 met with any substantial
public debate [28].
As with the earlier introduction of CCTV,
there was no attempt to develop legal regula-
tion and deliberation processes for determin-
ing authorization and appropriateness of the
use of ID scanners (for a contrasting example
see [29] on the legal regulation of CCTV in
Spain).
The most significant event occurred after
November 2007 and involved reforms to
Victoria’s liquor licensing laws that intro-
duced an expanded banning order procedure
originally applying to ten designated areas
across the state including the Geelong CBD.
Section 148B of Victorian Liquor Control
Reform Act [40] now enables police to imple-
ment a zonal ban preventing a person from
entering a designated area for behaviour con-
sidered to ‘give rise to a risk of alcohol-related
violence or disorder’. The bans apply to rela-
tively minor public drunkenness or obscene
language offences, or more serious assaults,
sexual assaults and unlawful weapons of-
fences occurring within the zone ([40], Sched-
ule 2).
All of these behaviours were already prohib-
ited under existing state criminal laws. When
coupled with a short-term ban, a person is
subject to a $500 fine and must immediately
leave the designated area for up to 72 hours
unless they live or work within the zone.
Failure to comply with the ban carries addi-
tional fines and the prospect of an extended
banning order, which can also be imposed as
a punishment for any serious offences com-
mitted ‘wholly or partly in a designated area’
attracting a maximum imprisonment term of
less than 12 months. In these cases, police, the
Office of Public Prosecutions or a court must
be satisfied the extended order ‘may be an
effective and reasonable means of preventing
the commission … of further specified of-
fences in the designated area’ ([40], s.
148I(1)(c)).
Available data indicates that in the first six-
months of operation, the Victoria Police used
these banning powers sparingly. From De-
cember 2007 to 30 June 2008, 129 bans were
issued to 128 ‘unique persons’, with one
person being banned on two occasions. All
bans were implemented in Melbourne CBD
and surrounding declared areas, where there
are far greater concentrations of nightclubs
than the less populated Geelong zone. Only six
per cent of people receiving bans in this initial
period were women, while 66 per cent were in
the 20-29 year age category. A further 22 per
cent were under 20 years of age, while 9 per cent
were between 30 and 39 years of age ([30], p.
9).
Periodic government media releases on offi-
cial websites or in Victorian newspapers reveal
that between December 2007 and January
2010, police issued 2,492 short-term banning
notices. Around 95 per cent of bans were
directed at men, with 2,144 orders issued in the
Melbourne CBD ([30], p. 9) [31].
After a change of government in December
2010, this banning regime was expanded to
cover several additional public order offences,
while increased fines now accompany on-the-
spot bans and subsequent breaches of short-
or longer-term banning orders. In addition,
the banning powers now apply to three new
designated areas [32] and further provisions
enable police and all venue managers and their
security staff in Victoria to impose a graded
series of bans ranging from one to six months
for various alcohol-related offences occur-
ring in or near individual venues. These ‘bar-
ring orders’ attract fines of up to $2000 if a
banned person is detected within 20 meters of
the venue where the order applies ([40], s.
106).
The methods for enforcing either short-terms
bans issued by police, venue operators and
security personnel, and the extended bans
imposed by a magistrate’s court, are not
stated within the relevant legislation. While
available data indicates only sixteen bans have
been imposed in Geelong between December
2007 and December 2009 ([30], p. 9), the
relatively systematic introduction of ID scan-
ners amongst the high-risk venues in this city
provides an enforcement template for other
designated areas to follow. Enhanced infor-
mation networking between venues also now
makes the task of enforcing bans and in-
creased fines for these low-level liquor viola-
tions in the Geelong designated area poten-
tially much easier.
However, questions regarding data security
and information privacy remain squarely
outside the official discourses that support
these new surveillance measures. Of particu-
lar concern is the lack of agreed protocols that
enable patrons to enter a venue in the Geelong
CBD without having their identity scanned.
The common practice is to insist that ID
scanning is a mandatory requirement before
entry is permitted. If patrons decline this re-
quirement, they are routinely told ‘… its for
security … (w)e just say it’s the law’ ([33], p.
22).
The philosophy underpinning this approach is
simple. Venue managers believe ID scanners
are a valuable method of promoting venue
safety by allowing security personnel to
‘quickly identify [troublesome patrons] and
ban them’ ([33], p. 22). Any countervailing
concerns over information privacy, data secu-
rity or police access to scanned information
are secondary to the overriding belief that ID
scanners can efficiently identify patrons banned
from venues deploying this technology, or
that they are a valuable deterrent against
troublesome or underage patrons attempting
to enter any licensed premises within the
Geelong CBD.
3. Conclusion
Like many other forms of dataveillance, ID
scanners contribute to new forms of ‘par-
ticularized’ citizenship that can compromise
universal or rights-based access to govern-
ment and private services ([10], p. 731). While
such measures can enhance community safety,
they can also exacerbate social ‘segmenta-
tion’ when supplemented by ‘multiple hybrid,
civil, contractual, and administrative’ legal
requirements aimed at regulating a growing
number of ‘irregular citizens’ or ‘antisocial
youth’ ([17], p. 389; 394-397).
There are numerous unknown questions sur-
rounding how police manage and use the data
obtained from participating nightclubs in the
Geelong CBD to help enforce Victoria’s ban-
ning regime. Data security, the manual entry
of a banned designation and protocols over
information sharing, all of which are subject
to many legally enshrined privacy controls,
remain to be clarified given the overriding
importance of promoting safer night-time
economies through more intrusive forms of
computerised surveillance.
The Queensland report also advocated repli-
cating the Victorian legislative model by in-
troducing the ‘power for police to ban trouble
patrons from entertainment precincts for 24
hours’ and allowing ‘courts to issue a banning
order where there is persistent alcohol-related
Neither the report nor the government’s formal response clarifies
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